Giving Philanthropy a New History

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Everyone knows that there’s no such thing as a free lunch. Uncovering the hidden costs—of time, money, freedom, and moral standing—of charity, relief, welfare, and research grants has long been a central preoccupation of historians of science, welfare, and philanthropy. In the U.S. context, the history of foreign aid, caught up in a tangle of public-private partnerships, hits on similar themes: what exactly is the value of the food, public health supplies, and technical expertise that Americans “give” to foreign nations, and at what price for the recipients?

Social historians, diplomatic historians, and policy historians have generally been more than willing to acknowledge the complicated nature of these give-

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and-take relationships. But for historians of science, the question always seems to boil down to the issue of whether, and how, money shapes knowledge. Consider, for instance, a classic disagreement between Robert Kohler and Lily Kay on the meaning of money in the life sciences: Was the Rockefeller Foundation’s 1930s-era investment in the new science of genetics an essential helping hand to the best and the brightest of America’s scientists, or was it a technocratic attempt at social control, ultimately designed to legitimize modern industrial capitalism? Such accounts—obviously oversimplified here—are premised on the assumption that financial connections, once documented, speak for themselves. While Kohler and Kay disagree on their interpretation of the Rockefeller Foundation’s actions, they more or less agree on what those actions were.

This once provocative approach may now be reaching the limits of productive inquiry. Following the money can’t solve Kay and Kohler’s disagreement: it can’t tell us what money means. A recent spate of books on the history of philanthropy, foundations, and poverty relief use a more varied set of methodological tools to offer new insights without losing sight of the fundamental issues at stake in the relationship between donor and recipient. While only one of them (Ruswick) is directly concerned with the history of science, the other three (Cullather, Parmar, and Zunz) contain essential background for understanding the role of private foundations in the broader course of American history, including the history of science and medicine. None is perfect, though Cullather’s The Hungry World comes close. All are worth a read.

Two of the books under discussion here, Inderjeet Parmar’s Foundations of the American Century and Olivier Zunz’s Philanthropy in America, take opposing


3. As an example of what can and cannot be accomplished with this approach, see the essays in Mark Solovey and Hamilton Cravens, eds., Cold War Social Science: Knowledge Production, Liberal Democracy, and Human Nature (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
views on the question of foundations’ dedication to the public good. Having opened *Foundations of the American Century* first, I assumed that Parmar’s stated argument that the major foundations’ “large-scale aid programs for economic and political development failed to alleviate poverty, raise mass living standards, or better educate people” (3) was at least in part a straw man. Surely there are not really people out there—serious people—who assume that these foundations exist solely to improve the lives of others. Then I read *Philanthropy in America*. While acknowledging that American foundations have had some “openly conservative manifestations,” Zunz wants to show how these same organizations are “funding a global civil society” and have “enlarged American democracy” (7). His book “tell[s] the story of the convergence of big-money philanthropy and mass giving that has sustained civil society initiatives over a long twentieth century” (3); these efforts have funded scientific research, built universities, and eliminated disease. Parmar, in contrast, grudgingly acknowledges that yes, foundations may have helped to reduce poverty and spur development both at home and abroad, but any actual accomplishments “played second fiddle” to their broader projects of extending American networks “for globalist ends” (257).

The reader who persists past the debate-club premise of both books (“Foundations: Yay or Nay?”) will eventually be rewarded with rich details on the legal decisions and public-private networks that have sustained American philanthropic foundations throughout the twentieth century. According to Zunz, citing figures from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the nonprofit sector (including but not limited to foundations) accounted for 5.5 percent of U.S. GDP in 2009, a figure comparable to the Pentagon’s budget. The institutional success of the nonprofit sector has been built on changing interpretations of inheritance law and broad categories for tax exemption. Throughout the nineteenth century, Zunz explains, major philanthropic efforts had been limited by the “dead hand” of the donor: “the legal obligation for trustees to follow strictures only because they were the donor’s wishes” (3). Heirs could contest bequests made, or administered, too broadly, with the courts generally siding with jilted relatives over public charities. Around the turn of the twentieth century, however, the probate courts—faced with a previously unimaginable scale of private wealth—began to embrace a broader definition of charity, defined as “something done or given for the benefit of our fellows or the public” (17). Instead of requiring that donors direct their gifts for a specific purpose, for example, to provide a baked potato for every student at Bryn Mawr, the courts allowed the creation of private foundations with extraordinarily vague charters.
The most famous of these, of course, include Rockefeller’s “promotion of any and all of the elements of human progress”; Carnegie’s encouragement of the “investigation, research, and discovery, and the application of knowledge to the improvement of mankind”; and Guggenheim’s “appreciation of beauty” (22).

Not coincidentally, it was around this same time that the United States established a federal income tax. The ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment in 1913 put the fortunes of the nation’s forty thousand millionaires at risk. Robber barons and their widows increasingly preferred to steer their fortunes away from public coffers and toward their own, more idiosyncratically defined versions of the public good. The Treasury Department’s decision to offer tax-exempt status to certain nonprofit organizations not only encouraged this practice, but also forged a shared interest among the newly minted philanthropic managers. As Zunz tells it, the history of philanthropy in America centers on the negotiation between the nonprofit sector and the Internal Revenue Service over what exactly constitutes a benevolent activity. Enormous sums of money were at stake: Zunz estimates that Henry Ford II and his brothers skirted $321 million in estate taxes by transferring 90 percent of Henry and Edsel Ford’s stock to the family foundation in 1943. Hence, as Zunz says, “the commonly heard charge that the leading American foundation of the 1950s began as a tax-dodge” (174).

Although Zunz does discuss specific projects here and there, his account is not primarily concerned with what foundations actually do with their money. He is especially not interested in foundations’ support for the social sciences, a major preoccupation of the role of foundations in the history of science. Instead, as one might expect from the author of Making America Corporate, Zunz approaches the problem through the lens of the organizational synthesis, focusing on how nonprofits were administered and managed and how the sector fits into the larger capitalist economy. At times, this makes for odd reading: Philanthropy in America is surely the only book to tell the history of Margaret Sanger’s Birth Control League as a tale of tax appeals. Published criticisms of the book have excoriated the author for his habit of presenting the best interests of the philanthropists’ accountants and tax attorneys as inevitably


good for American social policy; it is perhaps too much to ask for balance in a book that starts off with acknowledgments to the Ford and Kellogg Foundations and that comes stamped with a blurb from the president of the Carnegie Corporation. Nevertheless, however limited the book’s critical engagement with the politics of charitable giving, Zunz’s research on the legal foundations of the nonprofit sector is a valuable and accessible addition to the history of philanthropic organizations.

Inderjeet Parmar approaches the problem of foundations’ role in the broader American system from an entirely different theoretical perspective. *Foundations of the American Century* uses a series of case studies to develop a neo-Gramscian theory of how the Big Three foundations (Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller) have served as instruments of American foreign policy, from the 1930s to the present. Parmar’s particular gloss on Antonio Gramsci’s theory of power focuses on the role of intellectuals’ “economic, political, and social self-awareness” (10) in consolidating class interests. A sociologist, Parmar wants to understand how private organizations came to fulfill certain roles of the state, thereby extending state power through “state-private networks.” The author elaborates his notions of networks and their role in establishing and maintaining hegemony in a theoretically oriented first chapter; the point is that elite, nonstate actors (whom Parmar implicitly treats as intellectuals) came to see their interests as aligned with those of the state and developed institutions to extend and maintain their power.

The book’s most important contribution is undoubtedly Parmar’s careful documenting of the overlapping personal and professional networks that connected foundation leaders, administrators, and the U.S. foreign policy establishment. He uses the tools of prosopography to show that the members of the boards of trustees of the Carnegie, Rockefeller, and later Ford Foundations were the same sorts of men (and in some cases, the same men) who developed postwar American liberal internationalist policies. Almost all of the trustees were white, Protestant men who attended elite educational institutions and joined the same social clubs. Many held senior appointments in government. John Foster Dulles, for instance, was a trustee of both the Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; between 1953 and 1958 he served as Eisenhower’s Secretary of State—and his brother, Allen,

headed the Central Intelligence Agency. The ranks of the thirty-three Ford Foundation trustees between 1951 and 1970 for whom biographical information is available included “four national security advisers . . . ; three presidents of the World Bank . . . ; two major newspaper publishers . . . ; five university presidents; and a secretary of defense” (53–54).

While none of this is exactly news to anyone who works on the history of the Cold War, documentation of the specific links among these various organizations has been surprisingly hard to come by. In its absence, writings on this topic sometimes veer into conspiracy theory or breathless accounts of backroom partnerships between the Ford Foundation and, say, the CIA. By systematically cataloging these connections, Parmar frees future researchers from the need to prove what should be obvious to anyone who has spent time in the foundations’ archives: namely, that the links between the major philanthropic organizations and the U.S. foreign policy establishment were deep, systematic, and intentional. (The timing is fortuitous: the Rockefeller Archive Center’s recent accession of the Ford Foundation archives means that more researchers will soon have the opportunity to witness these connections firsthand.) Parmar’s neo-Gramscian analytical frame suggests a tidy way to move beyond “following the money”: it doesn’t really matter whether, for instance, Ford’s support for a particular project actually came from the CIA or from Ford’s own coffers because, either way, Ford’s interests aligned with those of the government. As Parmar puts it, “Ford operated with a rather formal notion of ‘independence’. . . . In practice, the Ford Foundation was a strategic part of an elite state-private network that united key elements of a Cold War coalition—a historic bloc—behind an imperial hegemonic project” (122).

This focus on hegemonic networks drives Parmar’s choice of case studies. From the Ford Foundation’s sponsorship of Henry Kissinger’s International Summer Seminar at Harvard to the Rockefeller Foundation’s support of
centrist economists in Chile, Parmar shows how foundation-sponsored pro-
gramming created institutions and communities that drew foreign elites closer
into the American orbit. Because institutions tend toward self-perpetuation,
these networks, once established, served as ideological beachheads for the
liberal (in the economic sense) capitalist worldview even after foundation
dollars had been withdrawn.

While convincing as far as it goes, Parmar’s account of the role of founda-
tions is limited to their entanglement with American foreign policy. Read in
concert with the other books under review here, this approach raises a number
of intriguing questions. How, for instance, did the Big Three foundations’
work abroad mesh with their grant-giving at home? To what extent was the
U.S.’s generous tax policy toward the major philanthropic organizations
guided by the understanding that the foundations shared in the government’s
work? Should the intellectual content of the foundations’ overseas work, par-
icularly in universities, be understood as part of the hegemonic project, or
primarily as an extension of intellectual trends that developed in parallel?9 The
United States was hardly the only nation to attempt to extend its international
influence through the cultivation of elites in the twentieth century. What were
the similarities and differences between the U.S. approach, with its reliance on
public-private partnerships, and that of the Soviet Union, China, and the
former colonial powers? While Parmar does not have much to say on these
issues, his clear and focused demonstration of the links between foundations’
work abroad and U.S. foreign policy lays a necessary groundwork for making
sense of the postwar philanthropic era.

The major philanthropic organizations discussed by Zunz and Parmar grew
out of earlier traditions of charity and benevolence. Zunz, especially, endorses
the traditional view that foundations’ “scientific” approach to understanding
and alleviating the causes of poverty represented a significant break from earlier
forms of philanthropy. The new foundation managers’ embrace of scientific
management was not, however, unprecedented. Brent Ruswick’s Almost Worthy
is an attempt to uncover a longer history for the “science of charity” in the
practices of nineteenth-century Charity Organization Societies. The twentieth-

9. David Engerman, in particular, has recently criticized scholarship on Cold War–era social
sciences as overstating the impact of social and political events on the intellectual development of
several fields. Engerman, “The Rise and Fall of Wartime Social Science: Harvard’s Refugee
Interview Project, 1950–1954,” in Solovey and Cravens, Cold War Social Science (ref. 3), 25–44.
century poverty experts in Nick Cullather’s *The Hungry World*—nutritionists, geneticists, economists, and development theorists—shared the conviction that the tools of modern science and technology could eradicate poverty and hunger, this time on a global scale.

Whether attempting to combat pauperization in nineteenth-century Indianapolis or raise the per capita daily caloric intake in the Philippines, poverty experts for the past two centuries have fixated on identifying the relationship between poverty and biology. For charity workers in the nineteenth century, the familial aspects of poverty seemed unmistakable. This raised obvious questions for charity managers, who worried whether poverty was hereditary, or perhaps contagious. For them, the central question boiled down to whether supplying food and money (“outdoor relief”) to widows and unemployed people would inoculate them against future troubles, or lure them into a life on the dole (“pauperization”). Ruswick’s book is a study of the developing community of experts who attempted to answer these questions with the best social scientific tools available at the time: surveys, statistics, and pedigrees. In his words, “Scientific charity reformers set the pace for investigating charity applicants, counting incidents of various types of misfortune, distilling those cases into groups, and pronouncing laws of society based on the inductive method” (30).

In response to the energetic leadership of such reformers as Indianapolis pastor Oscar C. McCulloch and New Yorker Josephine Shaw Lowell, cities across the industrialized Northeast and Midwest set up Charity Organization Societies (COSs) as a means to impose order on what had become a confusing and duplicative system of public, religious, and ethnic relief. Instead of “indiscriminate almsgiving” (16), charities that participated in a COS turned over their relief lists to a central investigating agency that determined “which poor they could relieve and what sort of relief should be given” (106). Every charity applicant received at least one, and sometimes multiple, visits from “friendly visitors” (usually middle-class female volunteers) armed with fill-in-the-blank surveys that evaluated the applicant’s worthiness for help. Ruswick describes these “statistical blanks” in fascinating detail—a central argument of the book is that historians of science should take scientific charity seriously as a form of scientific practice.

At least through the 1870s, these questions and visits seemed designed to discourage, rather than distribute, aid; Lowell once famously said that “Not one cent” (108) of funds raised by the New York City COS went to the relief of the poor. A funny thing happened, though, when investigators tried to convert
their data into explanations for the ultimate sources of poverty. The financial panic of 1893 presented charity managers with throngs of hardworking, temperate, morally scrupulous people who had fallen on hard times through no fault of their own. In the winter of 1894–95, Lowell noted, just over 1 percent of relief applicants at the University Settlement of New York had previously requested help. Ruswick describes the conversion of several of the leaders of scientific charity to something close to economic radicalism in the 1890s. With strikes, factory lockouts, and mechanization, it became clear to McCulloch, Lowell, and a surprising number of their colleagues that capitalism was as much responsible for poverty as morality or biology. Of all the philanthropists, foundation managers, and development specialists discussed in the four books under consideration here, only Ruswick’s had the self-awareness to question the ideological underpinnings of their work.

No such crisis of confidence plagued the men who populate Nick Cullather’s *The Hungry World*. Cullather had, according to the preface, originally intended to write a history of the so-called Green Revolution; the project quickly morphed into a study of how food security and poverty eradication claimed a central place in twentieth-century international politics. The unlikely beginning of this connection is the invention of the calorimeter in 1896. This device allowed nutrition experts to calculate, for the first time, the amount of energy provided by individual foods. The mathematical specificity of the calorie stripped food of its cultural meanings, reducing food to something that nourished the body and, just as importantly, powered work. “The calorimeter,” Cullather writes, “translated the vernacular customs of food into the numerical language of empire” (18). A 1936 report from the predecessor to the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization crystallized the association of three numbers that would thereafter define global hunger: daily minimum caloric requirements, per capita food consumption, and total volume of food produced. Having established that all humans, everywhere, should be entitled to 2,500 calories a day, it was easy enough to arrange nations on a hierarchical scale of their ability to feed their own populations. When “hunger,” thus defined, was equated with political instability, the logic that governed much of twentieth-century U.S. foreign policy had been set.

At a time of American agricultural surplus, global disparities in food production offered solutions as well as challenges. Much of Cullather’s account focuses on the tensions between on the one hand, agricultural economists and modernization theorists, who saw the issue as one of balance and distribution; and, on the other, nutrition experts and foundation managers, who fixated on
self-sufficiency. When the U.S. Congress passed the Food for Peace Act, otherwise known as P.L. 480, in 1954, the law simultaneously identified a dumping grounds for surplus American grain stockpiles and suggested a politically acceptable path to supplying foreign aid to problematic allies—particularly India. At the time, the U.S. government was spending “an estimated $1 million per day” storing corn, wheat, cotton, and soybeans; within a few years, P.L. 480 had grown into the primary channel for nonmilitary foreign aid (142). By 1960, India was importing more than 4 million tons of American wheat while devoting 20 million of its “most fertile and irrigated acres” (180) to growing exportable textile fibers. The foreign currency produced through sales of jute, cashew, and other cash crops could be used to import the heavy machinery and raw materials needed to build the factories, steel mills, and power plants that would propel India’s economy into a modern, industrial future.

For their part, Rockefeller and Ford Foundation managers (sounding like nothing so much as nineteenth-century charity workers) worried that nations whose official planning efforts relied on food aid were falling into a cycle of dependency. At precisely the same historical moment that MIT modernization theorist Walter Rostow was urging leaders of newly independent nations to embrace sustained economic growth as the surest path to peace and prosperity, foundation experts sounded the alarm on Asian nations’ inability to feed their exploding populations.10 First in Mexico, and later in India, foundation managers excluded export crops from their visions of a successful agricultural policy. A 1956 Rockefeller Foundation report, for example, declared Indian agriculture to be dangerously “stagnant,” “a tragic situation on a grand scale,” but “made no mention of the fibers and nonfood crops that grew on one-fifth of India’s acreage” (181). Instead of using its foreign currency reserves to purchase materials for steel mills, Rockefeller Foundation officials urged India to invest in the fertilizers that would allow Indian farmers to grow the new “miracle” varieties of corn, wheat, and rice being developed in foundation-funded laboratories across the developing world: never mind that the most popular varieties of wheat in 1960s India had been developed by agronomists at

the Punjab Agricultural University at Ludhaina with funding from the Ford Foundation.

Cullather’s account of how the “farm-first” argument both won and ultimately failed is rich, mature, and satisfying. In what is rapidly becoming a crowded field on the history of U.S.-led modernization efforts, *The Hungry World* stands out. Cullather combines the most productive tools of discursive analysis—a focus on narratives, models, and images—with archival findings on different sorts of institutions on three continents. These documents make clear that not all of the Big Three foundation managers were quite as much in agreement with U.S. foreign policy officials as Parmar would suggest, yet support the broader contention that U.S. foundations’ international projects profoundly shaped the globalization of markets.

The strongest complaint that can be lodged against *The Hungry World* has more to do with genre than execution. Cullather and Parmar’s books, and the portions of Zunz’s work that deal with the international arena, are all fundamentally books about the United States in the world. While this approach certainly is an improvement over earlier studies that considered foreign policy solely from the perspective of Washington and New York, it still falls short of true transnationalism. This criticism isn’t quite fair to Cullather—he is careful to include, for example, the opinions of the Mexican *agronomos* who pushed for a grain-first, fertilizer-intensive strategy over Rockefeller officials’ objections. Readers similarly encounter much more about, say, the Indian Planning Commission than is typical in this sort of book. But beyond this, I missed the perspectives of Soviet and Chinese economists who presumably had their own visions for the proper path to modernity and their own institutional strategies (presumably not involving family foundations) for how best to achieve them.

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12. The practical barriers to writing such an account are, of course, immense. The book that comes closest is Odd Arne Westad’s prize-winning *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007). For all its
Cullather, Parmar, and Zunz all end their books with reflections on present-day global philanthropy. Zunz, as one might expect, expresses decidedly more optimism than the others about the future of what Parmar acidly calls “neo-liberal philanthrocapitalism” (265). Interestingly, only Zunz has much to say about the role of private charities in alleviating contemporary domestic poverty; Ruswick’s paupers have long lost their hold on the American philanthropic imagination. But in all cases, I wondered how different these epilogues on the post–Cold War world might have been had the accounts themselves considered additional Cold War actors. “Official” contemporary U.S. foreign aid consists mainly of military support, leaving actual “relief” to NGOs; meanwhile, the China Development Bank supports infrastructural projects in more than ninety countries in search of, as the bank’s English-language website puts it, “win-win solutions overseas.”13 The U.S. approach during the Cold War, with its emphasis on public-private initiative, was unique, but its more curious aspects, including an ideological obsession with arm’s-length state policy, cannot be understood without a more thorough discussion of the alternatives. But unless and until someone attempts to write a truly global history of poverty relief, these four books provide essential perspectives on understanding how Americans have attempted to spend their private money for the public good. Since not a small portion of this public good involved scientific and medical research and technological development, historians of science would do well to revisit the history of philanthropy.

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